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Abstract. We address a key puzzle in policy studies: why don’t major differences in political 
systems and policy produce major differences in policy processes, outputs, and outcomes? We 
show why key aspects of fracking policy are similar in the UK and Switzerland despite the UK 
majoritarian government being ‘all out for shale’ and Switzerland’s consensus democracy 
favouring moratoriums. We use the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ and new survey data to 
show why differences in UK and Swiss processes are subtle. In both cases, actors cooperate 
and compete with each other by sharing information within and across coalitions.”   
INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, UK and Swiss fracking policy and policymaking seem very different. The UK 
government is at the heart of a ‘majoritarian’ system which centralises policymaking and can 
impose policy from the top down, while many veto points clearly exist in Switzerland’s 
‘consensus’ democracy. The UK government is pro-fracking, while Swiss authorities have 
come out against it. In that context, the current lack of differences in their policy outcomes and 
policymaking styles are striking: why, if the UK Prime Minister is ‘all out for shale’ (Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2014), and his government can impose policy, has there been limited 
commercial development and, in several important ways, a tendency to respect subnational 
policymaking? Why is policy and policymaking surprisingly similar in the UK and 
Switzerland?  
There are two main answers to these questions: first, the UK Government is, in practice, not as 
unequivocally in favour of fracking as ‘all out’ suggests, and UK policymaking is generally 
not the ‘top down’ polar opposite of Swiss policymaking. Second, the macro-political context, 
in which the majoritarian and consensus labels seem like contrasting archetypes, does not have 
a decisive impact. In other words, many other factors affect policymaking, policy outputs and 
outcomes, and the macro-political context has an indirect influence on them, at best. In 
particular, there are common pressures on central governments to share regulatory functions 
with many other bodies. They also exhibit the same reliance on policy subsystems in which 
coalitions of actors (a) cooperate within coalitions, and compete with others, to share 
information designed to give them the upper hand in policy debate, or (b) cooperate to some 
extent across coalitions to negotiate policy compromise. Their policy processes are not 
identical, but the differences are more subtle than one expects if the main frame of reference is 
macro-politics.  
We explain these dynamics in three ways. First, we establish a new way to help answer a 
fundamental question in politics: what is the effect of macro-political factors on policy and 
policymaking? This question has long been at the heart of comparative studies, but debates 
between classic explanations of policymaking remain unresolved. One literature emphasizes 
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the importance of the macro-political institutions of political systems. It identifies contrasting 
archetypes and the often-misguided expectation for ‘top-down’ policymaking to produce 
quicker and more radical policy change in majoritarian systems (Lijphart, 1999). Another 
literature identifies important policymaking practices common to policy subsystems 
(Richardson, 1982), but does not track systematically the macro-political effect on subsystem 
dynamics.  
In that context, these limitations in comparative policy studies can be addressed by theoretically 
informed systematic case study analysis which evaluates (a) the extent to which major 
institutional differences in political systems influence subsystem dynamics, and (b) the 
potential effect of those dynamics on policy outcomes. To that end, we use the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) to compare subsystem practices, showing how actors with shared 
beliefs form coalitions, how they exchange information within and across coalitions, and how 
coalitions compete with each other to turn their beliefs into policy (Sabatier and Weible, 2007).  
Second, we examine to what extent fracking policy change differs in the UK and Switzerland. 
In the case of fracking, policy change most often means a shift from the absence of clear policy 
to: (a) policy in favour of commercial fracking development; or (b) the introduction of clear 
regulations to halt or ban fracking activity. Only the UK government has gone ‘all out for shale’ 
and only the UK’s national policymaking institutions can be exploited to promote this change 
quickly, but so far the effect on outcomes has been limited. The clearer output is in Switzerland, 
where fracking has been temporarily banned in the most relevant cantons, but UK and Swiss 
policy outcomes are very similar as little commercial fracking has taken place in either country. 
Third, we ask to what extent fracking policymaking differs in the UK and Switzerland. We 
begin with the well-documented insight that contrasting political systems often produce similar 
processes: policymaking often happens at a decentralized level, and governments and other 
actors negotiate political settlements in subsystems. Yet, differences in macro-political context 
produce the possibility that the UK and Switzerland have distinctive subsystem dynamics.  
We use a systematic comparative analysis, gathering the same type of data and applying 
identical methods to two ‘most different’ systems, to identify differences and similarities in the 
two countries, and link them to macro-institutional factors. We identify a non-trivial distinction 
between pro- and anti-fracking advocacy coalitions, and show how they share information to 
influence the policy agenda and policy outputs. In all systems, actors share information 
primarily with their allies in coalitions, but also with their competitors to aid negotiation. In 
the relatively competitive atmosphere of majoritarian systems, actors appear more likely to 
internalise the supply of information and refuse to share it with their competitors. Thus, macro-
level institutional differences do not necessarily cause differences in policy, but they influence 
the ‘culture’ of policymaking. Consequently, the macro-political context is important, but not 
in the simple ways usually expressed in comparative politics. 
The impact of contrasting macro-political institutions: do they cause major differences in 
subsystem dynamics? 
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A key approach in comparative politics is to focus on formal macro-institutional structures of 
political systems. The point is made most strongly by Lijphart (1984; 1999: 5-7; see also 
Gallagher et al, 1995; Lane 2001): the UK and Switzerland represent contrasting institutional 
archetypes: ‘majoritarianism’, a unitary government structure, and ‘top-down’ policymaking 
characterizes the UK; while Switzerland is known for its ‘consensus’ democracy, federalist 
structure, and participative politics. Switzerland has an established culture of direct and regular 
participation via referendums (Vatter, 2009; Papadopoulos, 2001; Lijphart, 1999). Direct-
democratic instruments oblige public authorities to negotiate policy solutions with minority 
groups. Federalism offers potential veto points and allows actors to defy a policy solution 
favoured by central government (Thorlakson, 2003; Linder and Vatter, 2001; Tsebelis, 1995). 
It contrasts with the alleged ‘government knows best’ approach of the ‘British political 
tradition’ (Cairney, 2011) even following governance reforms such as devolution (Flinders, 
2010). In this limited comparison, consensus democracies encourage ‘compromise and 
concertation’ between government, regions, and interest groups; in majoritarian systems, there 
are fewer attempts by governments to compromise with, or build consensus among, different 
actors (Lijphart 1999: 5).  
This approach assumes that there will generally be major differences in policymaking, and that 
they are best explained by divergent political systems. Policy change driven from the ‘top’ 
would be quicker and more substantive in the UK, since power is more concentrated in the 
centre and there are fewer ‘veto points’.  
An alternative, found in comparative policy studies, is to focus on where the action is: policy 
subsystems. When we go beyond reputations built on macro-political institutional analysis, we 
find striking similarities in policy processes within different political systems. Further, we 
should not assume that differences in policymaking can be attributed to macro-institutional 
differences, since they may depend on the policy context and specific series of events and 
decisions in each country. 
The latter point is central to contemporary public policy analysis: the UK’s ‘majoritarian’ 
image has long been challenged in comparative studies (Richardson, 1982), and its alternative 
image as ‘consultative and non-radical … has been reinforced in an impressive number of 
studies comparing British policymaking with that of other countries and the European Union’ 
(Jordan and Cairney, 2013: 240; Cairney and Widfeldt, 2015; Cairney, 2011; Cairney, 2012: 
88-91). Early studies showed that UK central government is the home to many ‘policy 
communities’ composed of civil servants and groups. These findings have become reinforced 
by modern developments: the UK shares responsibility with the European Union, has devolved 
many responsibilities to governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and does not 
impose policies on local government by default. Adam and Kriesi (2007: 140) argue that the 
formal concentration of power in Britain does not help predict how it is used, while Kriesi et 
al.’s (2006: 357–8) comparative empirical study suggests that ‘national level generalizations 
about power configurations and policy processes’ are unreliable since British subsystems 
resemble ‘more closely those expected for consensus than for majoritarian democracies’. We 
should not assume that macro-politics will profoundly affect the nature of the subsystem 
dealing with particular issues.  
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Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework to compare subsystem dynamics 
Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has at least three theoretical and empirical 
advantages. First, the ACF defines key elements important to describing and understanding 
policy-making in subsystems, thus helping a systematic comparison across countries. Second,  
the ACF is conducive to the study of subsystems within a broader institutional context: it takes 
into account the macro-political differences identified by comparative studies of political 
systems to identify the context for actors’ interaction, while focusing primarily on actors and 
coalitions in subsystems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier, 1998; Weible et al, 2009; 
Jenkins-Smith et al, 2014; Mahoney, 2007, Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Third, we can generate 
new insights on the ACF, which began as a way to explain US policy dynamics, by comparing 
multiple European experiences. Such comparative ACF studies taking into account the macro-
institutional context are rare (Lubell, 2003). Overall, we are applying and enhancing the value 
of the ACF. 
The ACF suggests that individuals and collective actors engage in politics to translate their 
beliefs into policy solutions. Actors with shared beliefs form coalitions to cooperate with each 
other, and compete with coalitions with opposing beliefs (Sabatier, 1988: 139; Cairney, 2015). 
Coalitions are composed of actors ‘from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, 
interest group leaders, researchers) who ‘show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over 
time’ (Sabatier, 1988: 139). Beliefs can range from ‘core’ that are difficult to change, to ‘policy 
core’ that are still deep-seated, but more specific and related to one policy subsystem, and 
‘secondary aspects’ linked to technical matters on how policy aims should be met. 
A key aspect of interaction between and within coalitions is the process in which actors share 
information. Information exchange is crucial, as policymakers are boundedly rational and, by 
necessity, have to make decisions in the face of uncertainty (Simon, 1976; Zahariadis, 2007; 
Walker et al., 2013; Newig et al., 2005; Sigel et al., 2010; Metz and Ingold, 2014; Lubell 2013). 
Indeed, uncertainty can be used strategically. Some actors portray issues as clear and 
straightforward, and others stress uncertainty (Newig et al., 2005). Policymakers then decide 
who, and what information, to trust, to help them develop a sense of risk associated with any 
decision. Actors debate risk in relation to potential reward; and, policymakers weigh up the 
risks of their actions in terms of the problem and the effect of their decision in relation to their 
popularity and other aims. In other words, ‘evidence-based policymaking’ is a political process, 
involving competition to decide what information counts (Cairney, 2016; Ingold and 
Gschwend, 2014).  
Policymakers also make decisions in the face of ambiguity, which regards the ways in which 
policy problems are framed. Actors can entertain many ways to understand an issue. 
Policymaking involves persuasion to encourage people to think about issues primarily in terms 
of their positive or negative aspects; or, the potential for events, media, and powerful actors to 
shift attention to one at the expense of the other (Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 1; Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1993: 11-2; Kingdon, 1984: 3–4; Cairney, 2012: 183).  
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The ACF suggests that coalition partners primarily share information with each other and seek 
to exclude actors from opposing coalitions. They are particularly careful with political 
information on strategies designed to frame problems and influence which level of government 
should have responsibility for policy. Yet, actors also engage in more technical debates on 
science and risk, and they are often expected to do so with their competitors. One coalition may 
try to promote technical information to reduce the appearance of uncertainty. Another may 
exploit uncertainty and challenge the status of technical information to highlight the risks of 
policy change. Consequently, we show how actors promote or block the exchange of  technical 
and political information within and across coalitions. 
Fracking policy: unequivocal opposition in Switzerland, tentative support in the UK 
One expectation, based on the UK Government’s stance backed by its macro-political 
institutions, is that rapid and substantial policy change in favour of fracking is more likely in 
the UK. Yet, we do not find evidence of this major shift. Instead, it generally promotes 
supportive economic and regulatory measures to reduce the planning burden on firms (in the 
Infrastructure Act 2015), and increase financial incentives for local communities (BBC News, 
2014; The Guardian, 2015). Its strategy is to provide the conditions for private companies to 
decide (following test drills) how economically viable their operations will be (DECC, 2012; 
2014a: 26-8; 2014b: 6; White et al., 2014: 4-6). These moves are reinforced by measures to 
encourage preliminary development, including: tax breaks on capital investment; the promise 
of government compensation to local areas (DECC, 2013b; HM Treasury, 2013; BBC News, 
2014 - note that ‘the Crown’ owns the mineral rights and the government would collect and 
administer the compensation - Beebeejaun, 2013); the reform of planning guidance for England 
to reduce obstacles to development (Jones et al., 2014b: 357); and, a pro-fracking public 
engagement strategy (DECC, 2014c; Sciencewise, 2013).  
This approach has produced many pro-fracking policy outputs but they have not translated into 
many concrete outcomes, partly because central government is a key actor but not the sole 
decision maker. It has overall responsibility for energy policy, retains ownership of mineral 
and gas resources, provides licenses for private companies to operate, and in England retains 
the right to overrule local planning decisions. However, it has left crucial aspects of policy to 
devolved governments, responsible for the national planning guidelines which to all intents and 
purposes give them a veto on development (Cairney et al, 2016). It has also maintained the 
ability of English local authorities to control planning permission for drilling sites, albeit while 
changing the planning rules to increase the likelihood of planning permission, and retaining the 
right to ‘call in’ applications of national importance. While it has signalled its support for 
development in particular areas, including the North West of England, it has not gone ‘all out 
for shale’ in the sense of imposing commercial development on local areas. Instead, it accepts 
its part of a multi-level process which includes the need for companies to have licenses from 
DECC and multiple public bodies (such as the Environmental Agency) and planning consent 
from devolved and local areas  (DECC, 2013a: 10; DECC, 2013b: 10). Scotland will also 
receive licensing powers from the Scotland Act 2016. Many of these points of consent represent 
new ‘venues’ for anti-fracking actors to slow down the process (House of Lords Economic 
Affairs Committee, 2014: 6-7). For example, in 2015, the Scottish and Welsh governments 
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introduced moratoriums and Lancashire council rejected a major planning application (Cairney 
et al, 2016). 
In the federalist system of Switzerland, the exploitation and use of natural resources in the 
underground is regulated in a decentralized way. Cantons have a mineral royalty law that 
regulates the use of those resources and gives the competence to the canton to distribute 
concessions to firms. No fracking can take place without the express permission of cantons. 
The permission procedures have to take into account the protection of natural resources, 
drinking water and ecosystems, which are regulated by national law. 
Hydraulic fracturing has been a policy issue mainly in three Swiss cantons - Neuchâtel, Bern 
and Vaud - and policy differs slightly among them. In Neuchâtel, Celtique Energie engaged in 
a preliminary discussion with cantonal authorities about exploration for any type of gas drilling. 
Its proposed drilling project in Val-de-Travers induced public opposition and parliamentary 
initiatives. This led to a moratorium in 2014 on all development for ten years, and a new 
cantonal mining law will ban shale gas exploration and extraction. In Bern, Seag and Celtique 
Energie hold exploration concessions. The parliamentary initiative asked for the opinion of the 
cantonal government on the prospective use of fracking, which was critical but did not envision 
a legal ban. Consequently, the cantonal Green party and environmental organizations started a 
successful popular initiative to incorporate a ban in the revision of the mineral royalty act. The 
first canton passing a moratorium on shale gas extraction was Vaud in 2011, following 
neighbouring France. It was installed following a parliamentary interpellation, arguing that 
risks and environmental dangers are too high and national coordination should be installed first. 
Development is suspended (although three gas companies previously held exploration 
concessions, and one received drilling permission and found gas). To sum up the Swiss 
situation, veto rights were activated and local political initiatives undertaken in all three regions 
under consideration. The issue of hydraulic fracturing was not (yet) shifted on the national 
level, but direct-democratic instruments are as strong on the national as on the regional and 
local levels in Switzerland. This is why we would expect similar strong opposition, and thus 
similar outputs and outcomes on the national level, as now on the regional one. Until now, 
however, one has to note that general public attention, and national media coverage of the issue 
of hydraulic fracturing is almost absent in Switzerland. 
Clearly, there are differences in British and Swiss policy statements which have translated into 
some key differences in outputs: each Swiss canton has halted development and, although the 
UK’s devolved regions have supported similar moratoriums, the ability of English local 
authorities to oppose development is still unclear. Yet, their outcomes remain similar: there is 
very little commercial development in either country. Indeed, we do not know if a recent 
decision to approve development by North Yorkshire county council (the first approved 
development of its kind since 2011 – BBC News, 2016) marks the beginning of major 
commercial development across England or a key exception. This is a striking statement given 
that the UK Prime Minister stated such unequivocal support. The UK’s political choices have 
not been reinforced by a top-down policy style associated with its majoritarian macro-political 
design, suggesting that its subsystem could resemble that ‘expected for consensus than for 
majoritarian democracies’ (Kriesi et al, 2006: 357–8). 
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Advocacy coalitions in the UK and Switzerland: Survey and data 
We describe advocacy coalitions and their relations based on a major new survey to explore 
these potential similarities in the formation and operation of fracking subsystems, albeit at a 
different territorial scale to reflect the initial division of responsibilities in each country. At 
their heart is a process of coalition formation, based partly on the beliefs of participants, and a 
competition between coalitions to set the policy agenda. Put simply, we aim to explain the 
direction of policy in terms of the structure of, and interactions within and across, coalitions. 
We focus primarily on information exchange. The main currency in policy debate is 
information: technical information to influence the scientific debate on the risks of fracking, 
and political information to influence the primary way in which policymakers understand the 
policy problem.  
We use empirical data gathered in surveys among key actors to identify advocacy coalitions 
and the ways in which they exchange information. We identify key actors, in the public and 
private sector, based on an in-depth analysis of official documents, media articles and 
secondary sources, and use positional (actors’ formal competence), decisional (their process 
participation) and reputational (power perception by experts and peers) analyses of networks 
(Laumann et al., 1983). For the UK, this resulted in a list of 34 organizations; for Switzerland, 
a total of 34 actors for Neuchâtel, 27 for Bern, and 25 for Vaud. Response rates reached 53% 
in the UK, and 65%, 74% and 48% in Neuchâtel, Bern, and Vaud.1 For the identification of 
advocacy coalitions in Switzerland, we excluded some actors (mainly because of partial non-
responses) and include 30 actors for Neuchâtel, 23 for Bern and 22 for Vaud. In all cases, the 
same survey questions and methods guided the identification of coalitions (first based on 
agreement and disagreement relations, then validated via belief assessment)2, their problem 
and uncertainty perception, policy preferences, and information exchange (see online 
Appendix I). 
What is the nature of advocacy coalitions in the UK and Switzerland? 
Based on agreement and disagreement relations3, we find evidence for two main advocacy 
coalitions in both countries. A pro-exploration coalition, in favour of determining the 
commercial potential of fracking, opposes an anti-fracking coalition. Table 1 displays mean 
values of beliefs and perceptions per coalition and case. In all four cases, the anti-fracking 
coalition perceives problems related to risks and environmental uncertainties much more 
seriously than the pro-exploration coalition. To reduce risks and uncertainties, anti-fracking 
members would like to rely on stronger state intervention and enhanced pro-environmental 
regulation (with the exception of the anti-fracking coalition in Vaud) such as water and air 
quality controls and chemicals disclosure (see online Appendix I, questions 9, 10 and 11). The 
latter confirms its perspective that fracking is primarily a potentially economically beneficial 
measure to improve the region’s or country’s competitiveness on the energy market (albeit 
from limited information, as many actors did not respond to some questions - see note below 
Table 1).  
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Table 1: Mean values in coalition beliefs  
Coalitions per 
case and 
country 
 
Stop fracking 
 
Problems 
related to 
fracking 
Pro-environ. 
fracking 
regulation 
Core beliefs 
 1= absolutely 
not 
4= stop 
completely 
1= no concern 
4= serious 
problems 
identified 
1= not necessary 
4= absolutely 
necessary 
1= individual/ 
market 
freedom 
4= state 
intervention 
Pro-exploration 
UK 
2.22 
(n=9) 
2.08 
(n=8) 
3.35 
(n=8) 
2.72 
(n=7) 
Anti-fracking 
UK 
4.0 
(n=4) 
2.86 
(n=4) 
3.6 
(n=2) 
2.88 
(n=2) 
     
Pro-exploration 
Neuchâtel 
1.33 
(n=3) 
2.19 
(n=4) 
3.39 
(n=4) 
2.23 
(n=4) 
Anti-fracking 
Neuchâtel 
2.72 
(n=18) 
3.00 
(n=18) 
3.71 
(n=13) 
2.63 
(n=14) 
     
Pro-exploration 
Bern 
1.5 
(n=2) 
2.52 
(n=3) 
3.07 
(n=3) 
2.23 
(n=3) 
Anti-fracking 
Bern 
2.5  
(n=14) 
2.61  
(n=14) 
3.36  
(n=13) 
2.53  
(n=13) 
     
Pro-exploration 
Vaud 
1.5 
(n=2) 
2.04 
(n=3) 
3.35 
(n=3) 
2.43  
(n=3) 
Anti-fracking 
Vaud 
2.5 
(n=8) 
2.84 
(n=7) 
2.69 
(n=8) 
2.55 
(n=8) 
Note: “n” per cell indicate the number of respondents to the respective survey question. Differences in number 
between coalition membership (Tables 1-4) and numbers displayed here (Table 5) stem from the fact that survey 
partners did not answer all questions. 
In the UK, the largest coalition is pro-exploration and contains the most powerful UK 
Government actors (Table 2). It cannot be described simply as a ‘pro-fracking’ coalition, since 
the common position is one that favours the development of fracking potential. It is opposed 
by a smaller coalition which can be described as ‘anti-fracking’.4 While it consists of only 6 
actors (in contrast to 25 pro-exploration members), they are central to attempts to impede sub-
national fracking projects.  
Table 2: UK pro-exploration and anti-fracking coalitions 
Pro-exploration (25) 
 
Anti-fracking (6) 
 
UK government bodies: Cabinet, Department of Energy and Climate 
Change DECC, Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO), 
Environment Agency, Health and Safety Executive.  
Parties: Green 
Party. 
NGOs: Campaign 
to Protect Rural 
England, Frack off, 
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Political parties: Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal 
Democrats, The Energy and Climate Change Committee of the House 
of Commons. 
Companies: Cuadrilla, IGas Energy, Centrica, Total, Shell, National 
Grid, United Kingdom Onshore Operators Group, Oil & Gas UK, 
Chemical Industries Association. 
NGO: No Hot Air. 
Science: Royal Academy of Engineering, Royal Society, British 
Geological Survey, CNG Services, Geological Society, Policy 
Exchange. 
Friends of the Earth, 
and WWF UK. 
Science: Tyndall 
Centre Manchester. 
 
In all three Swiss cantons the largest coalition is opposed to fracking (Tables 3-5). The 
coalitions include actors from the cantonal administration, green and centre-left political 
parties, municipalities and NGOs. In all three, a smaller coalition is not explicitly pro-fracking, 
but is opposed to a ban and labelled as ‘pro-exploration coalition’. It usually includes the 
economy-friendly Swiss People’s Party (unless in Neuchâtel), Radical Democratic Party, and 
energy firms interested in specific gas exploration projects (the oil and gas industry more 
generally is more reticent about engagement). Federal administrative actors are split among 
both coalitions (with offices responsible for the Environment and for Spatial Planning in the 
anti-fracking coalition, and for Energy and for Topology in pro-exploitation). The anti-fracking 
coalitions more successfully translate their beliefs into policy outputs. While Neuchâtel and 
Bern are planning a ban, actors agreed on a moratorium in Vaud, where the size and constitution 
of the two coalitions is more balanced. 
Table 3: Neuchâtel pro-exploration and anti-fracking coalitions 
Pro-exploration (4) 
 
Anti-fracking (25) 
 
Federal 
administration: 
Federal Office of 
Topography, 
Federal Office of 
Energy.  
Political parties: 
Radical 
Democratic Party.  
Companies: 
Celtique Energie 
Ltd. 
Cantonal administration: Cantonal Government, Cantonal 
Parliament, Department of Spatial Development and the 
Environment, Office of Consumption and Veterinary, Office of 
Energy and Environment.  
Federal administration: Federal Office for the Environment, Federal 
Office for Spatial Development.  
NGOs: Pro Natura, WWF, Collectif Val-deTravers, Greenpeace, 
Association of Friends of Farm “Robert”, House of Nature 
Association, Fishers’ Society of Bass-Areuse.  
Cantonal Parties: Social Democratic Party, Swiss People’s Party, 
Swiss Labor Party, Christian Democratic Party, Green Party, 
Solidarity Party, Liberal Green Party.  
Municipalities: City Council Neuchâtel, City Council La-Chaux-de 
Fonds, City Council Val-de-Travers. 
Science: University of Neuchâtel. 
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Table 4: Bern pro-exploration and anti-fracking coalitions 
Pro-exploration (5) 
 
Anti-fracking (17) 
 
Federal 
administration: 
Federal Office of 
Topography.  
Cantonal parties: 
Liberal 
Democratic Party, 
Swiss People’s 
Party.  
Companies: Swiss 
Oil and Gas 
Company (SEAG), 
Geo Explorers Ltd 
(Oil and Gas 
Company). 
Cantonal administration: Department of Construction, Transport 
and Energy.  
Federal administration: Federal Office for the Environment, Federal 
Office for Spatial Development.  
Companies: Energy Water Bern, Geo Energy Suisse. 
Cantonal parties: Christian Democratic Party, Green Liberal Party, 
Social Democratic Party, Bourgeois Democratic Party, Evangelic 
Democratic Party, Green Party.  
NGOs: Pro Natura, WWF, Greenpeace.  
Municipalities: City of Thun, Municipality of Rapperswil. 
 
Table 5: Vaud pro-exploration and anti-fracking coalitions 
Pro-exploration (6) 
 
Anti-fracking (15) 
 
Federal 
administration: 
Federal Office of 
Topography, 
Federal Office for 
Energy.  
Companies: 
Petrosvibri.  
NGOs: 
Employers’ 
Association Vaud.  
Cantonal Parties: 
Liberal 
Democratic Party, 
Swiss People’s 
Party.  
Cantonal administration: Cantonal Parliament, Cantonal 
Government, Cantonal Department of Spatial Planning and 
Environment, Cantonal Office for Energy. 
Municipalities: City Council Lausanne.  
Federal administration: Federal Office for Spatial Development, 
Federal Office for Environment.  
NGOs: Pro Natura.  
Cantonal Parties: Social Democratic Party, Solidarity Party, Swiss 
Labor Party, Green Party, Christian Democratic Party, Green Liberal 
Party, Free Vaud Party. 
 
How do advocacy coalitions exchange information?            
In a new issue such as fracking, one key aim of actors is to exchange and use technical/ 
scientific information to exploit or downplay unusually high levels of uncertainty, and to use 
political information to address ambiguity: influencing how actors frame problems and decide 
how they should be addressed, and identifying the most promising strategies. This focus is 
particularly useful to explain why the UK government pursues a tentative pro-fracking policy: 
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it has a clear way to frame the policy problem and seek to persuade other actors (low ambiguity) 
but not to settle how actors should weigh up the potential environmental costs and economic 
benefits (high uncertainty).  
In both countries, there is a sense of ‘unfinished business’. First, there is scientific uncertainty 
in relation to activities, such as drilling techniques for unconventional gas development, with 
a limited track record. Opponents of fracking try to exploit uncertainty to challenge policy. 
Yet, policymakers make key decisions despite their limited abilities to understand scientific 
reports or articulate risk, in part by relying on information from sources they trust. Second, in 
multi-level systems, in which a range of policy instruments can be adopted by different 
governments, there is uncertainty about who makes key decisions, or how many authorities 
come together to produce policy. Both types of uncertainty are compounded by ambiguity: as 
a policy problem, fracking can be ‘framed’ as an economic opportunity or an environmental 
disaster; as a policy responsibility, it can be defined in terms of national leadership or local 
veto. Indeed, opponents have gained traction by highlighting the UK Government’s lack of 
respect for local policymaking (Bomberg, 2015).   
This process of persuasion plays out in relation to the balance between potential risk and 
reward. The reward relates primarily to the importance of ‘energy security’, when a state is 
able to reduce its reliance on energy imported from other countries, and economic gains related 
to: tax revenue from mineral extraction; an improved balance of payments; capital investment 
and employment; regeneration in areas with low economic activity; and, lower energy bills. 
There is also a potential environmental gain if the main effect of local shale gas extraction is 
to rely less on imported fossil fuels (Bradshaw, 2014; Tosun and Lang, 2016).  
The risk relates primarily to environmental problems - over and above the risks to climate 
change of burning fossil fuels - including the: contribution of methane gas leaked during 
production to climate change; groundwater pollution, when the chemicals used to fracture shale 
enter the water supply; greater risk of earthquakes/ tremors from fracturing; and, air and noise 
pollution to local areas (Bradshaw, 2014; White et al., 2014: 13-6; Jones et al., 2013: 387; 
Friends of the Earth, 2013). This risk is not shared equally across populations (Jones et al., 
2014a: 512).  
Unsuccessful attempts to remove uncertainty and promote a positive image of fracking 
Pro-fracking actors seek to downplay scientific uncertainty (Newig et al., 2005; Ingold and 
Gschwend, 2014). The UK government frames the issue in terms of ‘energy security, 
decarbonisation and economic growth’ (DECC, 2014a: 4). It has sought information from its 
trusted sources, professional scientific bodies and businesses, to support its pro-exploration 
stance and frame the issue as an economic benefit with low risk when well regulated (British 
Geological Society, 2014; Andrews, 2013: 3; Postbox, 2013; White et al., 2014: 6-7; Royal 
Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012: 4).  
In Switzerland, on the federal government level, the Federal Office for the Environment 
(BAFU) is the main responsible actor. It formed a broad expert commission working on a report 
covering the technology of hydraulic fracturing, the geological potential, the regulatory 
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context, environmental aspects, and economical and societal aspects. Whereas the parts on 
technology, geology and environment are supposed to inform the government and its 
administration on aspects of scientific uncertainty, the parts on regulatory context and 
economical and societal aspects are to deal with political uncertainties. 
In both countries, the production and sharing of technical information is not enough to settle 
the matter. Rather, the ‘devil shift’ suggests that anti-fracking coalitions will not accept 
technical information at face value (actors in one coalition ‘demonise’ the actions of another - 
Sabatier et al., 1987), while genuine uncertainty about the future cannot be resolved by 
estimates on the impacts of fracking. Instead, current developments offer a snapshot of: a 
debate that has yet to be resolved; and, the nature of each coalition, including the extent to 
which they seek to resolve policy debates by sharing information. Some issues are addressed 
by the generation and sharing of technical or scientific information to attempt to reduce 
uncertainty about the risks and rewards of fracking. Policy uncertainties can also be addressed 
by sharing political information about where and how best to lobby, how policymakers can 
engage with groups to produce negotiated outcomes, and how groups can ‘frame’ the issue. 
When actors mobilise to influence policy, they may only share certain types of information 
with certain actors. For example, actors may only share information regarding political 
strategies with their allies, but might share technical information more widely, to engage in 
debate with their competitors. 
The evidence on information exchange within and between coalitions 
We assess the intensities by which coalition members exchange technical and political 
information with their allies and opponents (Table 6; online Appendix I, question 7). In the 
UK, densities of political information exchange are consistently higher within than across 
coalitions. This confirms a broad ACF assumption: actors with similar beliefs engage in a non-
trivial degree of coordination within their coalitions (Sabatier, 1998; Schlager, 1995). We 
further find that the pro-exploration coalition is the most active, and that it shares some 
information across coalitions. It provides the anti-fracking coalition with some political 
information and more technical information. This may indicate the willingness of the pro-
exploration coalition to integrate the opposing coalition into the process of finding a viable 
policy solution. Given that most members of the anti-fracking coalition take some part in 
actions against local fracking projects (Jones et al., 2013: 389; Beebeejaun, 2013), providing 
these actors with political information might be a strategy to reduce further protest. The 
relatively high amount of cross-coalition exchange of technical information (0.15) suggests 
that it is more ‘politically neutral’ than political information, but also that it is important for 
actors to deal with scientific uncertainty.  
This activity of the UK pro-exploration coalition might stem from the fact that leading 
administrative actors such as the DECC and the OUGO belong to this coalition. It could also 
indicate that the pro-exploration coalition attempts to convince members of the anti-fracking 
coalition to join their efforts to allow fracking if accompanied by strong pro-environmental 
legislation and meaningful involvement of local communities.  
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Table 6: Sharing political and technical information 
 Political 
information 
Pro-
exploratio
n 
Anti-
fracking 
Technical 
information 
Pro-
exploratio
n 
Anti-
fracking 
UK Pro-
developmen
t 
0.12 0.06 
Pro-
developmen
t 
0.24 0.15 
 Anti-
fracking 
0.02 0.11 
Anti-
fracking 
0.09 0.19 
       
NE Pro-
exploration 
0.13 0.17 Pro-
exploration 
0.38 0.24 
 Anti-
fracking 
0.00 0.21 Anti-
fracking 
0.14 0.20 
       
BE Pro-
exploration 
0.12 0.13 Pro-
exploration 
0.08 0.13 
 Anti-
fracking 
0.13 0.15 Anti-
fracking 
0.08 0.12 
       
VD Pro-
exploration 
0.06 0.08 Pro-
exploration 
0.08 0.10 
 Anti-
fracking 
0.10 0.17 Anti-
fracking 
0.08 0.14 
 
The effect of macro-institutional factors on subsystem dynamics 
In the UK, there is some cross-coalition exchange of information (Table 6), but it is consistently 
less intense than within-coalition information exchange. Does this pattern correspond to 
Lijphart’s (1999) expectation of conflict and competition in majoritarian systems, or to the 
more consensual types of interactions (Kriesi et al. 2006)? It is only by comparing systems that 
we can make a firm judgement about these patterns. We find ‘face value’ consensus 
policymaking at the UK national level, but only a comparison with a country like Switzerland 
allows us to identify a meaningful reference point.  
Indeed, some patterns of information sharing are different in the Swiss subnational 
constituencies (cantons). There is no clear coalition pattern because, in all three cantons, both 
political and technical information are exchanged within as well as across coalitions on a scale 
not found in the UK. More specifically, information exchange from the pro-exploration actors 
to the anti-fracking coalition is consistently more intense than information exchange within 
each of these two coalitions. On a general level, this corresponds to the expectation of more 
fragmented policy-making in consensual Switzerland (Kriesi et al. 2006). Our data thus helps 
us identify a more subtle influence of macro-political context than provided by Lijphart (1999): 
in the relatively competitive atmosphere of majoritarian systems like the UK, actors seem more 
likely to internalise the supply of information, whereas cross-coalition exchange is more 
common in consensus systems like the Swiss one.  
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Discussion and conclusion: the UK’s ‘majoritarian’ institutions have not produced a 
majoritarian style 
It would have been reasonable to expect policy change to be far greater and faster in the UK 
compared to Switzerland. In reality, the UK government has pursued a tentatively pro-fracking 
position within a multi-level system in which subnational actors are less in favour of 
development, while Swiss cantons have produced the less equivocal policy change by 
prohibiting fracking development. Policy outcomes in both countries are remarkably similar: 
national governments have not imposed the development of commercial fracking, sub-national 
governments are introducing fracking restrictions and bans, and (with one very recent 
exception) local communities have demonstrated high and, so far, successful resistance.  
A combination of macro-political institutions and policy choices does not explain these 
developments, but the former has some impact on the subsystem dynamics crucial to policy 
development. Our analysis shows a sense of nascent policymaking (Ingold et al, 2016; Cairney 
et al, 2016) with not-yet clearly defined and sometimes fragmented coalitions (which 
correspond to the situation at the time of our analysis and might change in the future). This 
coalition structure is combined with some level of agreement between pro- and anti-fracking 
organizations about treading carefully via some pro-environmental regulation. The UK 
dynamic can be explained by an imbalanced coalition structure where one coalition seems to 
dominate the process, but is only tentatively in favour of commercial development, and prefers 
a careful assessment of economic potential and environmental risks. Even though this coalition 
does not perceive serious environmental problems, it still agrees with the smaller anti-fracking 
coalition about the introduction of pro-environmental regulations.  
Further, what we see, so far, is an imbalance between coalitions at the UK central level only. 
We need more survey data on the multi-level dimension to confirm our initial finding, based 
on the analysis of events and policy documents, that this imbalance is overturned at devolved 
levels. Decisions against fracking development by devolved governments (Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland) would, to all intents and purposes, be binding. Decisions by local authorities 
in England have more potential to be overturned by the UK Government, or pro-fracking 
decisions may be more influenced by the UK’s combination of regulations, planning guidance, 
and financial incentives to encourage development.  
In other words, the UK government is at an early stage of trying to negotiate local opposition 
in England while also pursuing a national strategy. This process is still unfolding, and the extent 
to which the UK government may be willing to impose its will more strongly (or offer greater 
economic incentives to local communities) is unclear, as is the future of anti-fracking coalitions 
which remain fragmented, particularly in local areas. We are describing a snapshot in time, and 
the next snapshot may differ.  
In Switzerland, it is currently unclear if the national level will produce any regulatory 
guidelines or whether the issue is kept at the sub-national level (although current developments 
suggest that national actors would produce a moratorium similar to that of relevant cantons – 
Ingold and Fischer, 2016). At the moment, this seems less important than the decisions of each 
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relevant canton to prohibit commercial development. Neuchâtel and Bern wish to ban the 
application of fracking techniques whereas Vaud may extend a moratorium. Those outputs 
reflect negotiations and debates within and across coalitions focused on canton-level 
policymaking. In Neuchâtel and Bern, two larger anti-fracking coalitions, dominated by 
regional public authorities and centre-left parties, promoted the planned ban. In Vaud, public 
authorities were split across the two opposing coalitions. This slightly more even situation led 
to Vaud’s more temporary moratorium. 
Both countries process policy through subsystems, but the nature of information exchange 
within them differs significantly. Generally, coalition members tend to share information 
among each other and less so with their competitors. However, this effect is far more 
pronounced in the UK, reflecting a more competitive atmosphere. There is some exchange of 
political information from the larger coalition to other actors, perhaps to encourage the 
development of common ground, or seek to influence other actors; and the subsystem-wide 
exchange of technical information, to reflect widespread sharing of information in relation to 
scientific and regulatory uncertainty. In Switzerland, the pro-exploration coalitions appear to 
be less well organized – based on relatively low levels of information exchange within them – 
but there are still more significant flows of information from actors in the pro-exploration 
coalition to anti-fracking coalition members than within some of the coalitions.  
This comparative analysis helps us take the system/subsystem debate forward by pinpointing 
the effect of macro-level political systems on policymaking in subsystems. We also improve 
the value of the Advocacy Coalition Framework by applying it to new circumstances and 
modifying aspects of the framework itself. First, we show that the ACF is a suitable framework 
for studying policy outputs, change and outcomes at different levels. When comparing 
Switzerland and UK through the lens of the ACF we were able to conduct not only a cross-
country, but also a multi-level comparison. Focusing on subsystems dealing with the same 
issue, and potentially producing similar policy solutions, enables us to conduct research at 
multiple scales (Sabatier, 1999). Second, this research shows convincingly how institutional 
factors impact policy styles and processes (such as coalition formation and coordination) more 
directly than policy outputs or outcomes. The triangulation between institutions, politics and 
policy seems a promising pathway for future comparative research applying the ACF (see also 
Henry et al., 2014). Third, our results emphasize the link between political system and 
subsystem, showing that the dynamics of the latter help researchers understand how policy 
outputs and change occur.  
Overall, the case of hydraulic fracturing demonstrates a broader point about the study of 
politics: we would produce a limited explanation of events if we relied simply on a comparison 
between majoritarian and consensus systems to explain differences in policymaking and 
outcomes. Instead, it is important to identify the common problems that governments face, and 
the extent to which coalitions form in similar ways to cooperate with each other and compete 
with others to determine the ways in which governments solve them. In that sense, each country 
exhibits similar circumstances: the environmental costs are unclear but worrying; the economic 
rewards are not as high as in the US and are diminishing to reflect major reductions in oil and 
gas prices; and, there is no obvious way to translate public support in principle for development 
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(which is apparent but diminishing in the UK – O’Hara et al, 2015; Cairney, 2015), and national 
level oversight, into regionally specific fracking, because local publics and policymakers will 
generally oppose development. Although the UK Government appears to be more willing and 
able to do it, we miss a lot by assuming rather than demonstrating that its political will translates 
into major policy change.  
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Appendix I – Survey questions  
Note: Original surveys are in English (UK), German (Bern) and French (Neuchâtel, Vaud). 
Surveys in the three Swiss cantons and the UK were exactly the same (except of the actors’ list 
presented to the survey participants, see Tables 2-5 for actor details per case). The example is 
from canton of Neuchâtel. 
 
Question 6: Agreement and disagreement between actors 
The political debate on the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel 
involved a big number of actors. The following table (list of actors, consult here actors in 
Tables 2-5) contains a list as complete as possible of the relevant actors. Please check all actors 
with whom your organization mainly agreed upon policy measures to be taken to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel (second column). In a next step, please indicate 
all actors with whom your organization mainly disagreed about policy measures to be taken to 
regulate hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel (third column). If there are actors 
missing, please add them to the bottom of the list and indicate if your organization agreed / 
disagreed with them. 
 
Question 7. Technical and political information exchange 
The following table shows exactly the same list of actors as before. First, please check all actors 
from which your organization regularly obtained technical information during the policy debate 
on the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel. Second, please check all 
actors which your organization regularly provided with technical information during the policy 
debate on the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel. Third, please check 
all actors from which your organization regularly obtained political information during the 
policy debate on the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel. Fourth, 
please check all actors which your organization regularly provided with political information 
during the policy debate on the regulation of hydraulic fracturing in the canton of Neuchâtel. 
If there are actors missing, please add them to the bottom of the list and indicate if you obtain 
technical information from them, or if you provide technical information to them.   
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Question 9: Current problems related to fracking 
Following the opinion of your organization, please indicate the extent to which the following 
issues are current problems related to unconventional gas development: 1 not a problem/no 
concern, 2 minor problem, 3 moderate problem, 4 serious problem. 
Issues to be selected: 
 Contamination of ground and surface water 
 Competition of water supplies  
 Air pollution and air quality degradation 
 Landscape degradation 
 Nuisance to general public related to site development 
 Destruction of public lands  
 Patchwork of regulations across different institutional levels 
 Unclear competence distribution  
 Seismic activities 
 Local specificities are not taken into account 
 Lack of financial compensation for local communities 
 
 
Question 10a: Pro-environmental fracking regulation  
Below is a list of policy instruments which may be introduced for the regulation of 
unconventional gas development in the UK. Please indicate your organization’s level of 
agreement with adopting each of the following policy instruments independently of what has 
been done in the UK thus far: 1 strongly disagree, 2 moderately disagree, 3 moderately agree, 
4 strongly agree.  
 Monitoring of water quality 
 Monitoring of air emissions 
 Disclosure of chemicals in fracking fluids 
 Setbacks of wells from occupied buildings or natural features 
 Quality control of designing and constructing wells 
 Disposing or treating produced water 
 Quality control of constructing well pads 
 Mitigating risks from induced seismic activity 
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 Mitigating risks and nuisances to the general public caused by truck traffic, noise, and 
light from well site operations 
 Funding scientific research relating to environmental impacts of unconventional gas 
operations 
 
Question 10b: Favorite concession regime/ stop fracking 
Please indicate to what degree you agree with following types of concessions: 1 strongly 
disagree, 2 moderately disagree, 3 moderately agree, 4 strongly agree. 
 Exploration concession 
 Concession for site development 
 Exploitation concession 
 Moratorium 
 Ban 
 
Question 11: General attitudes/core beliefs 
The following statements reflect general attitudes, not related to unconventional gas 
development. Please indicate whether your organization agrees or disagrees with each 
statement: 1 strongly disagree, 2 moderately disagree, 3 moderately agree, 4 strongly agree  
 Independence of Switzerland from other countries 
 Economic efficiency 
 Ecological compatibility 
 Free market / competition 
 Security of the population 
 Social equity 
1 Note that for the questions used for coalition identification and information exchange, we are still able to use 
information about all  actors, independently of the exact response rate. Based on the network questions on 
actors’ agreement and disagreement as well as their information exchange (“provide with” and “receive”), we 
are able to deduce so-called “passive data”: actors  who did not answer our survey could still be mentioned by 
other actors with respect to agreement, disagreement or information sharing. Obviously, this data only 
corresponds to perceptions of the actors who answered the survey. 
2 Agreement and disagreement about policy design and measures to be taken has proved to be a good proxy 
grasping similar/divergent beliefs by one pair of actors (Weible and Sabatier, 2005; Henry and Ingold, 2011). 
Based on this relational data, actors with similar belief profiles can be identified and grouped within coalitions 
(footnote 2, Ingold 2011; Fischer 2015). In a second step, we assess core beliefs and secondary aspects of 
coalition members (see Table 1).  
3 To identify coalitions, we identify clusters of actors with similar beliefs. We rely on the ‘balance’ procedure in 
Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 1996; Nooy et al., 2005). This procedure continues until reaching an arrangement 
closest to the ideal structure. In accordance with the ACF, the ideal structure corresponds to a data matrix 
partitioned in groups, with only positive within-group-ties and negative between-group-ties. Deviations from this 
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arrangement are indicated with an error term (Doreian and Mrvar, 2009), and the solution with the lowest error 
term is chosen for interpretation (see Fischer 2014, 2015). 
4 A third, small group of research institutes – UK Energy Research Center, Chatham House – is not presented. 
